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Abstract
This article surveys the theoretical
foundations of interconnection policy.
The requirement of an interconnection
policy should not be taken for granted in
all circumstances, even considering the
issue of network externalities. On the
other hand, when it is required, an
encompassing interconnection policy is
usually justified. We provide an overview
of the theory on interconnection pricing
that results in several different
prescriptions depending on which
problem the regulator aims to address.
We also present a survey on the literature
on two-way interconnection.
Resumo
Este artigo faz uma resenha sobre os fundamentos
teóricos da política de interconexão. A necessidade
de uma política de interconexão não pode ser tida
como um dado em todas as circunstâncias, mesmo
em se considerando a questão das externalidades de
rede. De outro lado, quando tal política é requeri-
da, uma política de interconexão abrangente tende
a ser usualmente justificável. Provemos uma visão
geral acerca da teoria do preço de acesso a qual re-
sulta em várias prescrições diferentes a depender de
qual problema o regulador deseja enfrentar. Tam-
bém apresentamos uma resenha da literatura sobre
interconexão em duas vias.1_ Introduction
This article aims to survey the
theoretical foundations of
interconnection policy. The importance
of this topic for the success of
telecommunications regulation hinges
on the incentive that the vertically
integrated incumbent company owning
a local and a long distance network has
to deny (or charge a high price for)
interconnecting competitors from the
long distance market in its local loop
bottleneck. This occurred in the US
telecommunications market, given the
dependence of the new long distance
competitors, MCI and Sprint, on the
AT&T local networks to connect with
end users. AT&T was charged with
using its market power to reduce
downstream competition, raising rival
costs through refusal to deal high local
interconnection charges and reducing
the quality of access.1
In this regard, Viscusi, Vernon
and Harrington (1995, p. 504-505)
summarise the history of AT&T
negotiations with MCI about the
requests for local network
interconnection:
The initial response of AT&Tt oe n t r y
in 1969 by MCI was simply to refuse to
interconnect with them. In the FCC
decision in 1971, the FCC said AT&T
should interconnect with their competitors,
b u tt h et e r m sw e r el e f to p e nt oA T &T.
This did not improve the situation,
because AT&T placed considerable
restrictions on the specialised common
carriers. Only on 1974 did the FCC
order interconnection in its Bell System
Tariff Offering decision. When MCI
expanded entry into message toll service,
the same problem arose. Their entry was
approved by the US court of appeals in
1975, but not until 1978 was AT&T
forced to interconnect with MCI’s
Execunet service. Only in 1978 were
firms like MCI allowed to interconnect
with the local operating company as long
lines. Even after achieving this right, the
competitors to AT&Ti nt h eI n t e r c i t y
Telecommunication Market were still not
treated equally. It is generally believed
that AT&T’s competitors were given
poorer quality connections by Bell
operating companies. Customers had to
dial twenty digits to make a long distance
call with MCI, but only eleven with
AT&T. The result was that consumers
saw AT&T as offering a higher-quality
product, which forced its competitors to
offer a discount to compete. It was this
type of behaviour that led to the original
antitrust suit against AT&T.
In the UK, these problems also
appeared after the privatization of
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1 Noll and Owen (1995,
p. 342); Laffont and Tirole
(2000) describe in more detail
other means of reducing the
quality and/or increasing the
costs of a rival through
interconnection.British Telecom (BT), given the absence
of a policy of vertical break-up as
implemented in the antitrust suit in the
US and the lack of an appropriate
interconnection policy in that
country (Armstrong, Cowan and
Vickers, 1994, p. 239).
The first theoretical question is
whether an active interconnection policy
is always required, which is addressed in
the next section. Section III discusses
what is the best approach for
interconnection policy enforcement (if
any): general or detailed ruling? In
section IV, the question is what is the
optimal regulated access price. While it is
well established that an active
interconnection policy is required when a
dominant incumbent owns a local loop
bottleneck in telecommunications, it is
less clear in an environment where two
facility-based networks are competing in
the market place. Section V surveys the
recent literature on this issue.
2_ Is an active interconnection
policy always required?
The strategic importance of
interconnection in telecommunications
comes from the existence of
consumption network externalities in
the sector. These externalities confers a
prominent role to interconnection as a
competitive weapon. In this section, we
address the following question: Can we
justify interconnection enforcement by
the government everywhere in the
telecommunications sector?
While, based on the US
experience, Noll and Owen (1995)
show that interconnection is the key
element for a pro-competitive policy in
telecommunications, Mueller (1997,
p. 183) calls the attention to the risks of
an indiscriminate and active policy in
this direction:
if networks are bundles, then a policy
that equates bundling with restrictions on
competition is bound to find
anticompetitive behavior everywhere. Such
a policy will be perpetually at war with
the very basis of network efficiencies.
In other words, some constraints
on network interconnection imposed by
operators can be desirable to guarantee
efficiency in the sector. Muller (1997,
p. 174 and 188) identifies two (intimately
connected) trade-offs between a more
and a less comprehensive
interconnection policy. First, there is a
trade-off between customization and
uniformity of technologies that can
diverge from the optimum. A more
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tends to generate more uniformity across
networks than otherwise, and thus
diversity can be lower than optimal. This
lack of variety reinforces the tendency
for the best technology to be less likely
to be chosen as stressed in the literature
of standards.2
This trade-off, though
unambiguously valid in the short run,
can be challenged in the long run.
Competition in innovation is a long-run
process and one of the necessary
conditions for this process to happen is
through short-run interconnection for
the entrant. Initially, the entrant follows
the incumbent standards and, later,
creates its own (and perhaps improved)
standards. The entry in the first
(short-run) period is like a ticket to
participate in the second (long-run)
period. In practice, entrants are not
often able to achieve instantaneously
the size of the incumbents through
different technologies. Some initial
“learning by copying and by doing”
c a nb er e q u i r e dt ob ea b l et oc h a l l e n g e
established standards.
Second, a more comprehensive
interconnection policy, at the extreme
the requirement of complete
unbundling, can stifle competition
because no entrant will be willing to
build new infrastructure if he can use
the existing facilities of the incumbent.
We can refine the idea of Mueller
through the terminology of Laffont, Rey
and Tirole (1998a; 1998b) of entry based
on facility and unbundling.
Comprehensive interconnection policies
unambiguously dampens “facility based
entry”, but fosters “unbundling based
entry”. Thus, the real trade-off is
between interconnection, that facilitates
unbundling-based entry, and
facility-based entry and not between
interconnection and competition
in general.
Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 208)
show that the incumbent can use the
local loop rental charge to soften
competition with the entrant in the case
of the unbundling-based entry. So, the
efficiency of this kind of entry in terms
of fostering competition will depend
crucially on the regulation of this
variable. This means that policies
designed to foster facility-based entry
can be a preferable approach, mainly
when the information asymmetry of the
regulator is substantial.
According to Mueller (1997,
p. 180-181), this trade-off is not new in
telecommunications. He states that in
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2 See Katz and Shapiro
(1994); Besen and Saloner
(1994) for surveys on the
economics of standards.the beginning of the 20th century in the
US, what dampened competition in
telecommunications was not the
resistance of AT&T to interconnect,
but exactly the opposite. AT&T started
to license independent companies
discouraging facility-based entry. This
challenges the conventional view that
refusal to deal by AT&T was what
reduced competition in
telecommunications in the US. Mueller
(1997, p. 185) concludes that
abandoning access price regulation
should not be disregarded at all,
challenging a deep-rooted consensus
in this area.
Katz, Rosston and Anspacher
(1995) propose a two-stage process for
government intervention in
interconnection that stays in the middle
of the extremes of the
“non-interventionist” approach by
Mueller (1997) and the usual policy of
regulatory enforcement of “universal
interconnection”. Their proposal is
basically a cost/benefit analysis that
resembles the “rule of reason” approach
of conventional antitrust standards. In
the first stage, the regulator addresses the
existence of market power. If market
power of a company is not significant,
regulatory interconnection enforcement
is meaningless and the analysis should
end, leaving the operator free to make or
refuse interconnection agreements with
other companies. In the presence of
market power, the wedge created by
network effects between social and
private decisions become substantial,
requiring intervention through an active
interconnection policy.3 Observing the
presence of market power, the authors
describe a second stage of the analysis
that includes potential private and social
benefits and costs of interconnection
policy (p. 329 and 331), which includes
the costs of constructing and operating
interconnection facilities, restrictions on
network design, planning and innovation
and so forth.4
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3 According to the authors
(p. 334-335), the “market
power test” had already been
applied in the US. While local
exchange carriers with market
power were obliged to allow
commercial mobile radio
service providers to connect
them, the FCC refused to
enforce interconnection
between mobile providers.
The relevant market was
defined as the “termination of
wireline and wireless calls”. As
only a very small percentage
of total calls terminated on a
cellular, the FCC concluded
that there was no point
to be concerned about the
possibility that the
Commercial Mobile Radio
Service denies interconnection
to other carriers as an
anticompetitive strategy.
4 Notice, however, that
although interconnection
policy should not be enforced
on non-dominant carriers, it
should be required to
guarantee reciprocity from
them to the terms of
interconnection enforced by
the regulator and/or provided
by the incumbent.3_ General x detailed rulings
in interconnection
An important aspect of an
interconnection policy is whether the
regulatory framework should contain
detailed provisions or just general
principles. Deliberate delay to supply
interconnection was responsible for a
g r e a tp a r to ft h ed e l a yi nt h e
introduction of competition in
telecommunications around the world.5
Indeed, all countries that reformed their
telecommunications showed a common
pattern of hard negotiations on
interconnection. Since interconnection
agreements have several sources of
transaction costs, including those
stemming from incomplete contracts,
the incumbent tends to use this to
u n d e r t a k eaf o r e c l o s u r eb e h a v i o r .W e
briefly comment on the transaction
costs in interconnection contracts in
telecommunications.
First, there were several
unforeseen contingencies in the first
interconnection regulatory orders and
agreements between incumbents and
entrants worldwide. This was
extensively demonstrated in the
recurrent negotiations of MCI with
AT&T before the AT&T break-up that
last for more than a decade. Second,
even with previous international
experience in interconnection affairs,
there are new problems raised every day
in these negotiations, since the
incumbent will always tend to restrict
them to the minimum. The
introduction of new technologies in
telecommunications will remain as an
important source of unforeseen
contingencies for a long time yet.
Legal expenses can be partly
avoided if the regulator enforces its
rulings adequately. Being the first
administrative instance, the ruling is
supposed to supply general guidance
for the solution of disputes at the
judicial level. The threat of the
regulatory body to impose
administrative penalties (including the
cancellation of the grant) on the
incumbent companies should avoid
frequent resort to the judiciary by the
incumbent as a postponement device.
Furthermore, given the lesser degree of
information asymmetry between the
operators and the regulator compared
to the courts, his role as the first
arbitrator in interconnection matters
can reduce the problems of
“observability” and “verifiability” of the
fulfillment of the interconnection
contract provisions.6 Moreover, as the
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5 One of the charges on
AT&T under the lawsuit that
caused its divestiture was the
deliberate “abuse of process”
aiming to delay competition.
6 See Tirole (1988, p. 38)
for the differences of these
concepts.agency is not one of the parties, the
courts may rely in the regulator’s
reports as a neutral informed party to
decide, given their lack of expertise.
In sum, comprehensive rules on
interconnection do not seem an
excessive intervention, although
the risk of inadequate interference
always arises in the routine of the
day-by-day regulation. This seems an
unavoidable cost.
4_ Pricing access in “one-way”
interconnection
4.1_ Optimal access pricing in theory
The first candidate rule for optimal
access pricing is the marginal cost.7
However, there are several critiques to
marginal cost pricing rule in general.
One is particularly important to
telecommunications: the existence of
consumer network externalities,
formalized by Willig (1979).8 The
author uses the conventional consumer
theory to derive first-best regulated
prices to the networks in a Ramsey-like
problem. The requirement to correct
the market imperfection due to
consumer network externality through
access prices comes from the standard
argument that any new consumer linked
to the network does not internalize the
externality generated by himself. This
market failure should be corrected by
picking an access price below the
marginal access cost. But, as Mitchell
and Vogelsang (1991, p. 55) stress, the
importance of network externalities has
been weakening as penetration of
telephone service gets closer to 100% in
most developed countries (which does
no hold for developing countries like
Brazil). Therefore, this critique to
marginal cost pricing and the
prescription to choose optimal
regulated access prices below marginal
cost has also weakened.
While the network externality
reasoning suggests that optimal access
prices should be lower than the
marginal cost, the other main critique,
as quoted by Laffont and Tirole (1993,
p. 23-30), goes in the opposite
direction. The main critique stems from
the presence of increasing returns,
mainly because of the existence of
substantive fixed costs, which is very
usual in telecommunications. In this
case, marginal cost pricing implies a
deficit that raises the requirement to
cover it, including costly public funds.
To cover fixed costs in an
economically sound basis, the most
César Mattos 55
nova Economia_Belo Horizonte_13 (1)_49-80_janeiro-junho de 2003
7 As stressed by Laffont and
Tirole (1996, p. 240), the
principles that were built for
final goods can be perfectly
extended to intermediate
goods, just thinking about
the access good as another
final good.
8 See also Mitchell and
Vogelsang (1991, p. 57-60)
for the introduction of
network effects in Ramsey
formulas. The signal of the
departure of the optimal
price from marginal cost
becomes ambiguous.important theoretical alternative has
been the Ramsey pricing rule.
Supposing that there are n line of
business and designing a generic line of
business ask, the Ramsey formulas will
be the result of a problem that
maximizes the total surplus of the
economy, considering the break-even
constraint of non-negative profits of
t h ef i r m .T h eg e n e r a lf o r m u l af o rt h e
price in every line of businessk
will be given by:
P C
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where0is the shadow price of the
constraint of the problem directly
related to the magnitude of the fixed
costs. k is the elasticity of demand for
k. Notice that if	and k finite for
allk, the optimal price of every good or
servicek will always exceed its marginal
cost. The optimal access price will be
more distant from marginal cost, the
lower the price elasticity of demand of
the specific service. This happens since
the greater is this last variable, the
higher the impact of price increases in
the quantity demanded, increasing the
negative impact of a high price in a
given line of businessk on welfare.9
In the case of access pricing,
Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 255-258)
add some further considerations. The
fact that the cross-price elasticity of
demand between the incumbent final
product or service and the entrant’s is
strictly positive changes the solution of
the Ramsey problem. Assuming a
dichotomy property (prices must not
and are not used to provide incentives),
the new optimal final and access price
formulas substitute the ordinary price
elasticity of demand k,b ya
“superelasticity” formula that includes
k, cross-price elasticities and the
differential between the social value of
the incumbent profit and that of the
competitor’s. The importance of
introducing cross-price elasticities in the
Ramsey setting relates to the fact that
any “cream-skimming” strategy of the
entrant, “stealing” business from the
incumbent (the services are substitutes),
reduces the amount of resources
available to cover the incumbent fixed
costs. The optimal access price has to
increase to fill this gap of revenue and
also to reduce the amount of market
stolen. Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 260
and 1994, p. 1678) provide the results
for the case of one vertically integrated
company operating the local loop (0)
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9 See Mitchell and Vogelsang
(1991, p. 57-60) for the formal
introduction of network
effects in Ramsey formulas.and a long distance service (1)
competing with a non-integrated long
distance carrier demanding access (2):
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beingc i the constant marginal cost of
each service and “a” the optimal access
price. Note thatc 0 is the marginal cost
of the vertically integrated incumbent in
providing local service and also local
access for himself and for the
competitor.
0is the shadow cost of
the firm deficit represented by the
fixed costs.  1 and  2 are the
superelasticities.10, 11
Note, however, that just like in
the case of marginal cost pricing, the
inclusion of costs in the formula
provides low incentives for efficiency
in (2). That is why Laffont and Tirole
(1993, p. 258-266 and 1994,
p. 1679-1684) provide further steps to
address optimal pricing (final and
access), considering the proper
incentives to reduce costs. The optimal
rule is a variant of the basic trade-off
incentives/rent-extraction modeled by
Baron and Myerson (1982) and
developed in chapter 2 of the textbook
of Laffont and Tirole (1993). There are
two basic cases. First, the “common
network case” where there is no cost
difference between producing the
intermediate access service for internal
consumption or for sale to the
competitor. The optimal regulated
access prices for this case are solved
with and without complete information
of the regulator about the efficiency of
the regulated company. When there is
less than complete information about
the efficiency of the company, the
optimal regulated access price has to be
corrected by an incentive term. This
term can increase or decrease the
optimal access prices, depending on
whether an increase in the production
of the network good raises or not the
informational rents to the firms.
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 12() cross-price elasticities
of demand from the price of
service 2 (1) to the quantity of
service 1 (2).
11 Note that if the services are
substitutes, there is
cream-skimming, cross-price
elasticities are positive, and the
“super elasticity ” will be lower
than the ordinary elasticities,
decreasing the denominator of
t h eR a m s e yf o r m u l a sa n dt h u s
increasing the equilibrium
values of p1 anda.As firm rents are undesirable to the
regulator, optimal access prices will
increase if the production of the
network good raises rents.
While in the case of perfect
information, the optimal access price is
always higher than marginal cost, this
conclusion is not so universal when the
authors introduce the incentive
correction term. To be precise, we can
only be absolutely sure that optimal
access prices are higher than marginal
costs when the firm type is the most
efficient one and thus the incentive
term vanishes. For the other less
efficient types, an increase in the
production of the network good can
either decrease or increase the
informational rents if it, respectively,
decrease or increase the “ability” of the
firm to lie about its characteristics. In
the first case, the incentive correction
term will be designed to reduce the
optimal access price and can more than
offset the other terms.
The second basic case presented
by the authors (1993, p. 263-266) is the
“network expansion case”, where to
provide access to its competitors, the
regulated firm has to increase capacity.
The authors in this case are more
concerned with the incentive of the
regulated firm to exaggerate the cost of
increasing capacity to provide access
and thus inflate access pricing. The net
result of introducing asymmetric
information is always in the direction of
increasing access price.
The possibility of the
government to undertake transfers or
not to the regulated firm is very
relevant here, since what we are
discussing are optimal departures from
the basic rule of price equal to marginal
cost in order to raise funds to cover
part of the fixed costs. This is assessed
in Laffont and Tirole (1994,
p. 1686-1688). The authors show that
while the ratios of Lerner indices
remain constant when the possibility of
monetary transfers are dropped from
the model, the whole price structure is
shifted upwards or downwards,
including the optimal access price,
depending on how binding is the
budget constraint. The tightness of the
budget constraint will be basically
dependent on the magnitude of fixed
costs. The greater they are, the higher
the whole set of optimal regulated
prices of the firm have to be, including
the optimal access price. However, for
fixed costs low enough, those optimal
prices, including optimal access prices,
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of government transfers. This
apparently paradoxical result holds
because, in the absence of transfers,
firms have to pay more attention to
reduce variable costs than otherwise,
and so, the requirement for higher
prices, including the access price,
can be reduced.
The presence of market power
by competitors also alters the
computation of optimal access pricing.
Assuming that cross-price elasticities
are zero, Laffont and Tirole (1994,
p. 1688-1689) show that market power
decreases optimal access prices. This
result resembles the conventional
argument that a per unit subsidy can
increase welfare in a monopoly
situation. In this case, the subsidy
comes indirectly through a reduced
regulated access price.
Another important effect on
optimal access pricing is the possibility
of bypass. The main point raised by
Laffont and Tirole (1994, p. 1690-1692)
is the risk of inefficient bypass when an
access price high enough is settled to
help in the funding of fixed costs. To
conciliate avoiding inefficient bypass
and allowing the coverage of incumbent
fixed costs, one theoretical alternative
would be to decrease the access price
closer to marginal cost and charge a
per-unit service tax on the entrant and
transfer it to the incumbent. This would
avoid the inefficient combination of
inputs (efficient access through the
incumbent local network/alternative
technology) and at the same time allow
the coverage of the incumbent fixed
costs. However, in most countries
including Brazil, this is not a legally
feasible alternative. When this occurs,
an inefficient bypass is inevitable.12
The main problem of these
exercises based on Ramsey principles is
the huge amount of information
required to choose the optimal access
price. The general skepticism about the
feasibility of practical implementation
of Ramsey-based rules generated the
p o l i c yd e b a t eo v e rt w ob a s i cv i e w s ,a s
mentioned by Laffont and Tirole (1996,
p. 229). There are proponents of
accounting allocation rules for the
access deficit, known as “fully
distributed costs” rules and proponents
of “usage-based rules” in which the
famous Efficient Component Pricing
Rule (ECPR) is included. The authors
(1994, 1996, 2000 and 2000b) also
propose a second way: Global price
caps that induce optimal Ramsey access
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12 Despite the fact that bypass
is not always bad for welfare
as shown by Laffont and
Tirole (1993, chapter 6).and final prices. In the next subsection,
we discuss a little about fully distributed
cost rules for pricing.
4.2_ Fully distributed costs
A common procedure used by
regulators worldwide to regulate prices,
including access prices, is the “Fully
Distributed Costs” (FDC). The FDC
rule consists of some ad-hoc mechanical
accounting rule to appropriate joint
costs, existing in an infinity of potential
rules as such. Spulber (1989,
p. 128-130) presents three possible
FDC rules based on the:
i.shares of common fixed costs
and also nonattributable
components of variable cost on
relative outputs;
ii.relative revenues;
iii.relative attributable costs (ratio
of stand-alone variable costs to
total variable costs).
Spulber also shows that FDC
pricing has the potential appeal that it
can be properly chosen consistent to
subsidy-free pricing, avoiding the
break-up of the regulated company
under competitive pressure and
inefficient bypass.
FDC pricing has the virtue of
simplicity that is absent in
Ramsey-pricing. On the other hand,
FDC pricing does not have a theoretical
rationale like the Ramsey pricing. The
main critiques of FDC pricing are
summarized by Laffont and Tirole
(1996, p. 235) who stress that FDC
pricing, being cost-based, does not
encourage cost minimization, subsidises
inelastic-demand lines of business to
the detriment of elastic demand ones,
lacks the flexibility needed to deal
properly with large customers through
nonlinear tariffs, creating inefficient
allocation of resources, including
inefficient bypass and entry.
4.3_ Optimal access pricing
and the efficient component
pricing rule (ECPR)
The basic mechanics of the ECPR as a
guideline to regulate access prices was
first proposed by Willig (1979). We
present the same original formulation,
but in a slightly different way. Suppose
there is an entrant that “steals” x units
of a long distance market at a constant
price p from the vertical integrated
incumbent owning the local loop. The
remaining quantity for the incumbent is
defined as y units. There are some
relevant cost functions. First, the cost
function of the incumbent when there
is no entrant is defined asCx y i ()  .
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(net of access prices expenses) when
he/she enters and “steals” x units from
the incumbent isCx e() .T h i r d ,t h ec o s t
function of the incumbent when x units
of the long distance market is stolen by
the entrant and the former has to
provide x units of local access to the
entrant in respect of these units is
Cxy i (,) . Finally, the regulated access
price per unit of product isa. Willig
(1979, p. 139) states that:
the analysis of technical access prices
rests on the fundamental desiderata that
they yield profit incentives for the entry
of firms that would lower total industry
costs and that they discourage socially
undesirable entry.
The main question is how to
define the access price that achieves this
double purpose. There are two main
equations in this setting. First, the
entrant will have an incentive to enter if
and only if:
Px C x a x xe   () 0 (3)
The revenues of the entrant are
strictly higher than the costs, including
access costs. Also, entry will be
considered desirable only if entry lowers
total industry costs:
Cx y Cx C xy ie ( ) () (,)   (4)
Willig’s purpose is to find the
optimal access pricing (of)a*in such a
way that two conditions are satisfied:
Condition 1:I f :
Cx y Cx Cxy ie i ( ) () (,)   (5)
or total industry costs do not diminish
with entry, and so, entry is not
considered socially desirable, then:
Px C x a x xe   () 0 (6)
implying that (3) does not hold and the
potential entrant does not enter.
Condition 2: There is an incentive for
entry or (3) holds only if (4) holds total
industry cost decreases with entry,
which means that entry is socially
desirable.
One solution for this problem is to pick
a*such that:
Px a C x y C x y xi i   *( )( , ) (7)
To see that this is a solution for
Willig’s problem, suppose that there is
no incentive for the entrant to enter
and px C x ax xe   () * 0 .
Replacing (7) in this equation, we have
Cx y Cxy Cx ii e () ( , ) ( )    0.
Rearranging, we can check that
condition 1 is always satisfied. On the
other hand, suppose that there is an
incentive to enter and then (3) holds.
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C xyC yC x y ii e () ( ) ( , )    0,t h a t
is (4) holds and thus condition (2) is
also always satisfied. Therefore, (7)
satisfies both conditions 1 and 2 and
aa  *solves Willig’s problem.
The main appeal of (7) is that it
is always a solution, regardless of the
specific values of the cost functions,
which does not happen otherwise. The
interpretation of (7) is that the
difference between the revenues
obtained by the network and that it
would obtain from the access charges
to the entrant is equated to the
difference between the levels of costs
incurred by the network in the two
situations. This means that this access
price keeps the network’s profit
unchanged. Isolatinga*in (7), we find:
ap
Cx y Cxy
x
ii *
() ( , )

 (7’)
The optimal access price that
satisfies Willig’s conditions equals the
price per unit of the final good (part of it
“stolen” by the entrant) minus the
difference between the average cost
without and with entry. In other words,
the optimal access price equals the
forgone profit per unit of “stolen”
quantities by the entrant. This is nothing
but the opportunity cost of providing
access and has the property of keeping
the incumbent indifferent between
providing the final service
himself/herself or through the entrant.13
A clear virtue of this approach is
that the incentive for the incumbent to
foreclose disappears at least in the short
run, since his profit remains
unchanged.14 Besides the positive effect
it brings on its own, it also reduces the
need for a heavy-hand regulation of
interconnection. Moreover, Willig
(1979, p. 146) also stresses that if the
entrant is more efficient than the
incumbent in providing x or, in other
words, if his/her cost of providing x is
lower than the incremental cost of the
incumbent providing x, then total
profits of the incumbent can even
increase by supplying access. This
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13 Baumol, Ordover and
Willig (1997, p. 150-153) also
show that an equivalent
measure of the ECPR access
price isa* = (incremental cost of
providing a unit of input to rivals)
+ (incremental opportunity cost).
14 See Laffont and Tirole
(1996, p. 238). However,
considering the analysis
proceeded in Mattos (2001), it
is plausible that the fears of the
incumbent in the long run,
regarding being taken over by
the entrant can play a role. In
this case, the incentive for
foreclosure cannot be assessed
only through short-run profit
figures. Thus, this kind of rule
is not a panacea for avoiding
foreclosure behaviour in the
market and regulatory
oversight over interconnection
is still required.happens because if costs are lower,
the entrant is able to charge lower
prices, increasing quantity and thus
access revenues to the incumbent
which more than compensate forgone
profits from having business “stolen”
from the entrant.
The main alleged benefit of the
ECPR is that it sends the right signal to
entrants. They will enter if they are
really more efficient than the
incumbents and the net impact of their
entry is welfare enhancing (4 holds).
The access price rule in (7’)
became known as the Efficient
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and
was popularised by Baumol in several
writings.15, 16 Baumol and Sidak (1994,
p. 94) justify the ECPR stressing that
economic efficiency requires that prices
equal marginal costs, which includes the
opportunity costs incurred by the
producer. Since, in the current case,
there are forgone sales to the final
consumer and thus forgone profits
when the producer sells to his
competitor, these are opportunity costs
that must belong to the total
accountancy of marginal costs.
According to these authors (p. 99), this
p r i c er u l em i m i c st h ew e l f a r er e s u l t s
obtained in a perfectly competitive or a
perfectly contestable market.17 The
authors (p. 96-97) stress that the ECPR
was already used in railroads in the US
and in telecommunications in
California. The high court in New
Zealand had also adopted the rule when
deciding an antitrust litigation between
two telecom companies.18 Laffont and
Tirole (1996, p. 235-237; 2000, p. 168-
169) show that the access price rule
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15 That is why the rule is
known as the Baumol-Willig
rule. Other denominations
quoted by Baumol and Sidak
(1994, p. 95) are “the
imputation requirement”, “the
principle of competitive
equality” and the “parity
principle”.
16 Hausman (1996, p. 28-35)
proposes a similar pricing
method that he also calls as the
“imputation methodology”.
The difference is that instead
of using opportunity costs to
define access prices, it is used
to regulate final prices with
access pricing being defined
by the long-run incremental
cost. Thus, what differs is the
direction of causation coming
from the access price to final
prices and not the opposite as
in the ECPR.
17 The theory of contestable
markets is developed in
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig
(1982). Laffont and Tirole
(1996, p. 230) argue that the
contestable market paradigm
is not an adequate basis for
the ECPR.
18 Tye and Lapuerta (1996,
p. 464-485) are the most incisive
critics of the ECPR and
provide an extensive history
of the case of Telecom Corp
and Clear Communications in
New Zealand where the
central issue was the dispute
over the correct access pricing
rule. While the incumbent
Telecom proposed the ECPR
as the correct benchmark
supported by Willig and
Baumol as consultants, Clear
Communications defended a
cost-based rule.used by OFTEL in the UK from 1990
to 1997 boils down to the ECPR.
Laffont and Tirole (1994,
p. 1695; 1996, p. 242) ask in which
situation ECPR satisfies Ramsey
optimality requirements as given
in the system of equations (2). The
authors show that under full symmetry
on costs and demand of the two
operators in the long distance segment,
the ECPR yields the Ramsey result,
which reaffirms its positive properties.
To see this, note that if we suppose in
equations (6) that    1  ,a n d
ppa c 12 2   ,t h e nw eg e tt h eE C P R
as the optimal Ramsey rule.
ap c * 11 (8)19
Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers
(1996, p. 135) also derive the ECPR
from particular Ramsey formulas, but
when final product price is fixed
exogenously by regulation.20 The
authors (p. 138-143) also show a more
general ECPR formulation, introducing
a displacement ratio in the usual
formula, besides an extension of the
r u l et oi n c o r p o r a t eaR a m s e yt e r m .T h e
displacement ratio provides a more
sophisticated definition of opportunity
costs of the incumbent, allowing for
variable coefficient technology, bypass,
and service heterogeneity. The ECPR
formula provided by the authors
(p. 138-139) is:
ac p c *( )   21  (9)
where:c 2 is the direct marginal cost of
providing access to the entrant;
c 1 the marginal cost of providing
the final service to consumers;
 the displacement ratio.21
The ability of the entrant to
replace the input represented by the
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19 Larson and Lehman (1997,
p. 76 and 78) provide a more
detailed proof of this
equivalence, leaving clear the
whole (and strong) set of
assumptions behind symmetry
and also an intuitive
explanation: Ramsey optimality
requires equal percentage
mark-ups while the ECPR
requires equal dollar
mark-ups. The two will be
equal if there is symmetry.
20 Armstrong and Vickers
(1998) extend it for the case
of unregulated final prices. In
this case, the optimal access
price can be lower, equal or
higher than the marginal cost
depending on a trade-off
between allocative and
productive efficiency. A high
access price increases the final
price, increasing the
dead-weight loss (loss
of allocative efficiency).
On the other hand, a low
access price increases the
quantity of a supplier (or a
fringe of suppliers) that, by
hypothesis, has decreasing
returns and thus reduces the
productive efficiency.
21 This last one is defined as
the derivative of the
incumbent’s equilibrium final
product demand in respect to
the access price divided by the
derivative of the equilibrium
demand for access in respect
to the access price.local bottleneck by other means,
bypassing the incumbent reduces the
displacement ratio, which means a
shrinkage in the access price given by
the ECPR in (13). Furthermore, the
greater the service heterogeneity, the
lower the incumbent profits forgone
with access and the lower the resulting
access price. This could be a distinction
that would justify a lower access price
charged by the local wire companies to
mobile carriers than to other local wire
companies that provide a service with a
higher degree of substitutability with
the former. An important characteristic
of this redefinition of opportunity cost
is that the new optimal access price
(disregarding the Ramsey term) is
always lower than the one established in
the usual formula, since the
displacement ratio is always between
0 and 1. In other words, the effects of
product differentiation, bypass, and
technological substitution given in the
displacement ratio reduce access price
compared to the case where none of
these extensions are allowed.22
While the introduction of a
displacement ratio can be taken only as
a refinement of the ECPR principle,
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996,
p. 135 and 139) point out the
non-optimality of this rule. They show
that optimal Ramsey pricing (without a
regulated final product price) is higher
than that given by the ECPR rule,
which challenges the usual view that
this rule has a pro-incumbent bias. In
this regard, Laffont and Tirole (1994,
p. 1695-1696; 1996, p. 242) also show
that, assuming brand loyalty and/or
cost differential between the two
players, the ECPR does not coincide
with the Ramsey prescription, and so its
welfare properties hold just for very
particular cases.
In a less technical statement,
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996,
p. 149) argue that, in practice, access
prices lower than the ECPR can be
desirable to foster a process of
“learning by doing” and/or to
overcome inefficient entry barriers.23
Despite these critiques, the authors state
that the principle of including the
opportunity cost of providing access
seems an important ingredient to achieve
optimality in the access price rule.
There are other more
fundamental critiques to the ECPR.
The most important concerns the
definition of “competitive neutrality”
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22 Note that this is not a
departure from the ECPR
rule, but the proper ECPR,
relaxing the usual restrictive
hypothesis on which it is
usually assessed.
23 S e ea l s oL a r s o na n d
Lehman (1997) for two
departures from symmetry
and the same conclusion that
ECPR optimality does not
always hold.generally attributed to the ECPR. The
proponents of the ECPR argue that this
rule embodies a “weak competitive
neutrality property”, i. e., the incumbent
status confers neither an advantage nor a
disadvantage for prospective entrants. Tye
and Lapuerta (1996, p. 422) argue that a
proper definition of competition
neutrality must also require that
monopoly rents be dissipated and that
efficient competitors be privileged. The
authors call this definition as “strong
competitive neutrality”.
The main problem is that assuming
the pre-entry (and presumably
monopolistic) price p constant in (7’), the
ECPR rule is implicitly throwing out the
main prospective gains from competition,
that is, a decrease in price. The ECPR
would fail this test, since it perpetuates
monopoly rents.24
Baumol and Sidak (1994, p. 108-
109) had already recognized this critique,
but replied that ECPR is not the problem,
which can be found in the monopoly
prices that are allowed by the regulator for
the final product price.25 The problem
should be fixed through proper final price
regulation and not through access pricing.
Indeed, the reduction in the number of
goals to be pursued by regulators through
the single tool of access pricing is
desirable on its own, since it avoids the
problem of it becoming, as Laffont and
Tirole (1996, p. 248) state, “jacks of all
trades and master of none” Doane, Sibley and
Williams (1999) propose a departure from
the ECPR called the “M-ECPR” that
incorporates this concern. Price
reductions derived from entry are
accounted for in (7’), which eliminates the
perpetuation of monopoly rents. The
d i f f e r e n c ei st h a t ,a tt h es a m et i m e ,t h e
regulator uses an ancillary tool, by
charging the entrant an end-user charge
which is transferred to the incumbent in
order to satisfy his break-even constraint.
According to the authors (p. 322), this
rule differs from the conventional ECPR
in two aspects. First, this rule incorporates
(negatively) the reductions of final prices
generated by the introduction of
competition. Second, the M-ECPR adds
to the ECPR with an end-user charge in
order to fund the fixed costs of the
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24 This critique is also raised
by Economides and White
(1995, p. 570).
25 Baumol, Ordover and
Willig (1997, p. 147 and 159)
also recognise that the
ECPR, is not a sufficient
condition to achieve
efficiency, although it reaches
its main goal of levelling the
playing field of competition.bottleneck owner, in this way satisfying
his budget constraint.26
Economides and White (1995)
make a connected, but even more
essential critique to ECPR, by
challenging the usefulness of equation
(8) as a suitable criterion to define
socially desirable entry in the context of
previous monopoly prices charged by
the incumbent. According to them
(p. 560), the ECPR’s exclusion of
inefficient rivals may be socially
harmful, since the presence of even
inefficient players in the market can
reduce dead-weight losses and thus
compensate the increase in the total
costs of the industry, in this way
enhancing welfare in net terms. A less
efficient entrant will increase social
welfare when the inefficiency gap is not
too high and/or his entry results in a
tougher price competition (Bertrand
behavior, for instance).27
Tye and Lapuerta (1996, p. 451-
459) stress that even an equally efficient
entrant would not be able to enter
under the ECPR rule when there is at
least some positive sunk cost, since all
his profit will be appropriated by the
incumbent through the access pricing
rule. We can also add that when sunk
costs are substantial, even slightly more
efficient entrants will not enter. This
happens because they will recoup their
sunk costs at a rate given by their
productivity differential. If they are only
slightly more productive, it will take
time to recoup their sunk costs and if
their discount rates are large enough,
they will not enter. Tye and Lapuerta
(1996, p. 446) also stress that the ECPR
rule ignores dynamic benefits from
competition, which is really not
captured in the basic model advanced
by Willig. Considering the rapid
technological change in
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26 See the authors’ paper
(p. 324-326) for a full
comparison between M-ECPR
properties and the approach
currently adopted by the FCC
of precifying access at other
total element long-run
incremental cost (TELRIC).
Although M-ECPR is superior
in several circumstances, the
authors recognise that when
the entrant is less efficient than
the incumbent, the TELRIC
allows entry while M-ECPR
does not. As we see below by
the critique of Economides
and White (1995), even
unprofitable entry can be
desirable, depending on the
parameters of the problem.
Anyway, Baumol, Ordover
and Willig (1997, p. 147), by
recognising the validity of the
critique, state that the
elimination of the dead-weight
losses generated by monopoly
power should not be addressed
with access price rules.
27 Laffont and Tirole (1996,
p. 252) add another potential
positive aspect of (even
unprofitable) entry: the extra
information obtained by the
regulator when the entry
allows yardstick competition.
For a brief survey of yardstick
competition and some useful
modelling for regulation, see
Mattos (2001).telecommunications, negligence of
dynamic features can be taken as a
serious criticism.
Laffont and Tirole (1996) are
sympathetic to the core of the ECPR
idea and assess some interesting
departures from the basic ECPR rule.
First, they (1996, p. 248-249) argue that
when the entrant has some market
power and is able to charge a positive
mark-up m, it is desirable to discount m
from the pure ECPR rule given in (8).
The optimal access rule (called the
ECPR-M) would be:
ap cm *  11 (10)
At the same time, an excise tax
could be charged to the competitor and
transferred to the incumbent for the
sake of contributing to the access
deficit. In this scheme, the departure
from ECPR reduces the market power
distortion, but raises the access deficit
problem. The extra taxation allows the
ECPR-M to fulfill this function while
recovering the access deficit.28
Bypass is another concern of the
authors (p. 250-251) that could be
handled by avoiding excessive increase
in the access price coupled with the use
of taxes. However, the authors are not
very optimistic with the ancillary use of
taxes by regulators, since it is
information demanding, besides the risk
of extending excessively regulatory
powers. Potential tools to deal with
inefficient bypass mentioned by the
authors are the permission for the
incumbents to price discriminate access
rates through quantity discounts and
the offer of two-part tariffs.
On the other hand, when fixed
costs are high in a way that makes a
new entry unprofitable, even if socially
desirable, and a lump sum subsidy to
the entrant is impossible, then a
decrease in the access price below the
ECPR-M rule given in (10) to subsidize
entry can become optimal.
Finally, Tye and Lapuerta (1996)
stress the possibility of enlargement of
the concept of opportunity cost in the
ECPR. They (p. 463) argue, for
instance, that when an entrant
innovates, the incumbent can argue that
he/she would certainly have introduced
the new technology afterwards if the
entrant had not, claiming to include the
efficiency gains of the entrant in the
calculus of the opportunity cost. More
generally, the authors (p. 498) state that
this concept has become very elastic,
conferring a high level of subjectivity in
the calculus, even including monopoly
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28 Note that despite
the similarities with the
M-ECPR from Doane,
Sibley and Williams (1999)
introduced above, the purpose
and the result of both rules
are quite different.profits and potential future price
increases to the final customer.29 We
don’t think that this conclusion can be
derived from the statements of the
proponents of the ECPR rule.
However, this is a risk that the adoption
of ECPR cannot be considered free.
4.4_ Global price caps
The third important proposal for
regulating access price is done by
Laffont and Tirole (1996; 2000;
2000b). According to the authors
(p. 243), the imposition of a global price
cap can reach the optimal Ramsey
formulas if access is treated like a final
good, being included in the weighted
s u mo fp r i c e sa n di ft h ew e i g h t su s e d
are exogenously determined and
proportional to the estimates of
quantities. A global price cap with these
characteristics can be written in the
following way:
qp qp qa p 01 1 2 0   (11)
T h em a i na p p e a lo ft h er u l ei si t s
adherence to the Ramsey theoretical
precepts and the fact that it does not
demand more information than the
existing rules not requiring the
measurement of marginal costs and
demand elasticities. For the authors, the
key insight of the global price cap rule
is that the inclusion of access prices in
the price cap reestablishes the symmetry
between access goods and final goods.
The intuition for the optimality
properties behind the global price cap,
according to Laffont and Tirole (2000,
p. 170-171) is that this rule induces the
firm to internalize almost perfectly the
consumer net surplus in its objective
function by setting the weights equal to
the forecasted quantities.
Two other advantages of the
global price cap are that, according to
the authors (1996, p. 245):
i. the incentive to foreclose vertically
the rival is eliminated in contrast
to the more common rules used
by regulators who unevenly
reduce artificially access prices in
comparison to final good prices,
which reduces the access business
profitability compared to
other lines of business,
encouraging foreclosure;30
ii. by avoiding the practice of current
regulations of providing
different incentives for cost
reduction or profit enhancement
in different product lines,
the rule does not encourage
cross subsidies.
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29 These authors (p. 425-426)
show that the ECPR
proponents do not clarify if
they are proposing a regulated
access price or only showing
that leaving market forces
operate freely will lead
automatically to the most
efficient outcome, i. e. the
ECPR rule and thus there
w o u l db en or o l ef o rs t a t e
intervention in interconnection
pricing. That is why the authors
(p. 430-434) state that the
ECPR allows for the entrant’s
efficiency gains being
appropriated by the incumbent.
30 See Laffont and Tirole
(2000, p. 175-178, Box 4.8) for
a more theoretical based
discussion of the incentives for
foreclosure in the presence of a
global price cap.Besides showing the optimality
properties of the global price cap, the
authors (p. 244-246) also show that
when the access price is not included in
the weighted sum of the cap,
noncompetitive segments are being
cross-subsidized by the competitive
ones.31 The proof provided by the
authors for this statement is not based
on a pure global price cap, but relies on
a mix of global price cap with ECPR.
By makingapc  11 , (11) becomes:
qp q q p p 01 2 1 0   () (11’)
On the other hand, a partial
price cap rule that does not include
the access price is given by the more
general formula:
wp wp p 00 11  (12)
T h eq u e s t i o ni sw h a ti st h e
relative cost of increasing p1 in the
competitive segment (for instance, long
distance) compared to increasing p0 in
the monopolized segment (for instance,
local service) under (11’) compared to
(12)? Under a partial price cap rule like
(12), this cost is weighted only by the
incumbent demand in the competitive
segment divided by the total demand
on the monopolized segment
q
q
1
0
.
In other words, under the partial price
cap rule, the numerator is only a part of
the whole demand. On the other hand,
under a global price cap rule (11’), it is
weighted by the total demand in the
competitive segment also divided by the
total demand in the monopolized
segment,
qq
q
12
0

, which is the proper
unbiased weight between both
segments. As there is a downward bias
of the weight under the partial cap rule,
this results in an upward bias in the
price of the competitive segment p1
compared to p0.
Furthermore, the authors state
that complementing the global price cap
rule with ECPR can bring two important
benefits. First, comparing (11) with (11’),
it is easy to see that the informational
requirements of the second are lower
than those of the first. Estimating the
aggregate demand in (11’) is always easier
and less subject to errors than estimating
each of its component partsq 1 andq 2.
Second, and even more important,
mixing a global price cap with the ECPR
reduces the likelihood of predatory
pricing by the incumbent, who could
increase access prices and reduce his/her
price in the competitive segment, while
satisfying the global price cap constraint.
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31 By “partial price cap”
the authors mean a price cap
that does not include the
whole set of prices, including
the access prices.Predation in this case would occur
through two ways, the increase in the
rival costs (access prices) and the
strengthening of competition by
lowering the long distance price
of the incumbent.
Introducing the ECPR as a ceiling
for the access prices softens the most
important critique of the global price cap
rule, i. e., the fact that this rule can bring
an incentive for the incumbent to
predate when this agent proceeds to an
intertemporal maximization instead of a
single period one. According to Laffont
and Tirole (1996, p. 247) it is quite
simple to predate if the global price cap
is introduced and complementing it with
the ECPR, although not preventing it
completely, makes predation more
costly. On the other hand, the main
problem of introducing ECPR in the
global price cap rule is that the simplicity
of price cap rules is eliminated.32
5_ An overview of the literature
on “two-way” interconnection
Recently, with technological
developments that have been
challenging the natural monopoly
characteristics of the local network in
telecommunications, researchers have
started to think about the effects of
more than one operator at the
bottleneck level. Laffont, Rey and
Tirole (1998, p. 5) stress that the
literature on interconnection
concentrated much effort on the
study of better regulatory choices
by the regulator in the context of a
single bottleneck, but not on the
free-market result of symmetric
networks competing in the same area
and negotiating reciprocal
interconnection agreements.
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a
and 1998b) and Armstrong (1998)
sought to fill this gap, assessing access
pricing in an unregulated two-way
interconnection setting, deriving
important (and very similar) results.
Armstrong (1998) introduces the main
question: free negotiation on access
prices will maximize welfare or
regulation is still required?
The same main conclusion
emerges in these three articles. Free
market interconnection agreements, in a
context with two networks with not too
different sizes, can generate collusion,
with final prices different from the
social optimum. This means that
regulatory oversight on interconnection
agreements can remain important, even
after breaking the monopolistic
characteristics of the local loop.
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32 Other rules that tie final
prices in the competitive
segment with access price
such as pa c could also be
undertaken to avoid predatory
pricing incentive.Laffont, Rey, and Tirole present
two papers on two-way telephone
interconnection, one of them (1998a)
not allowing and the other (1998b)
allowing for price discrimination
between calls terminating in the
subscriber’s network and those
terminating on the rival’s network. One
of the main findings is that, since the
networks are differentiated, they have at
least some market power, which
introduces a distortion in final prices.
To correct this distortion, the
production must be subsidized,
justifying regulation of access prices
below marginal costs, which outweigh
their market power over each other,
when there is no common fixed costs
across users (but only individual costs
of connecting each user).33
Proposition 1 of the first paper
(p. 10)34 shows that, when the degree of
substitutability and/or the access price
between the networks are high enough,
there exists no equilibrium for final
prices in a model with reciprocal access
pricing.35 On the other hand, when
equilibrium exists (substitutability is not
too great), the access price becomes an
instrument of tacit collusion as shown
in their Proposition 2 (p. 11). High
access rates, even not affecting the final
equilibrium flow of revenues and
payments of access if the inflow of calls
coming from users in the rival network
and the outflows of calls going to users
in the rival network are balanced,
increase the marginal costs of off-net
calls, requiring price increases.
However, high access rates also
stimulate the networks to enlarge their
market-share to reduce off-net calls
that increase access payments. The
main way to increase the network
market-share is by reducing final
prices, which reduces the role of access
price as a potential instrument of tacit
collusion. On the contrary, the
incentive to build market-share
dampens collusion incentives.
In the second part of the first
paper, the authors address
non-reciprocal and non-cooperative
access prices in a two-stage game.
Contrarily to the reciprocal case, an
increase in the degree of substitutability
brings ambiguous effects on the access
charges. On one hand, the expected
impact of increasing access charges on
raising rival costs and inducing
increases in final prices is of softening
competition, which is a good result for
the seller of access. On the other hand,
this strategic effect is lower as long as
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33 When the authors
introduce common fixed
costs, the result is ambiguous
since the requirement
to recover them is added
to the problem.
34 The initial Propositions
of the first paper assume a
hypothesis of reciprocal
access pricing.
35 This basic conclusion
also holds for nonlinear
tariffs as shown in their
Proposition 7 (p. 21).the network buyer of access internalises
the greater loss of market share under a
high substitutability hypothesis. The
latter effect can dominate and reduce
equilibrium access charges prices under
some conditions.
The authors (p. 15-20) also
evaluate optimal access pricing by the
regulator in the context of
unbundling-based entry and
facilities-based entry. In the
facility-based entry, the authors
compare the case where:
i.the regulator mandates the access
price and the entrant chooses
the optimal coverage of his
network; and the case where
ii.interconnection negotiations are
fully unconstrained.
For strategic reasons, the entrant,
even under a regulated access price,
prefers to keep a small coverage,
dampening the regulatory target of
improving competition between
networks. This happens because the
authors divide the market in two: one
where both networks overlap and
another that is captive of the
incumbent. Furthermore, the authors
assume that the incumbent is obliged
not to price discriminate between these
two sub-markets. Then, when the part
of the market dominated by the
incumbent is large, if he/she reduces
the price in the overlapping part to
obtain market-share, he/she has to
reduce the price in the captive market
as well. However, the negative effect on
profits of the captive market from
reducing prices beyond the monopoly
level in this sub-market more than
offsets the increased market-share in
the overlapping market. Thus, the
entrant keeps its coverage low to
induce the non-discriminating
incumbent to avoid price wars and
charge high final prices.36
In a less regulated environment
where an interconnection agreement is
not compulsory (but still maintaining
the requirement of non-discrimination),
the incumbent charges a limit final price
aiming to corner the market. This
weakens the bargaining position of the
entrant, since there is no dead-line to
reach an interconnection agreement. So,
the incumbent delays the reach of an
interconnection agreement as much as
possible. The players will agree a large
access charge paid by the entrant and a
low access charge paid by the
incumbent,37 which tends to weaken the
challenge to the incumbent. On the
other hand, this situation reverses the
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36 In the words of the
authors, the entrant when
reducing his coverage and
expanding the captive market
of the incumbent, transforms
him into “a pacifistic fat cat”.
37 One of the hypotheses is
that there is no need for
reciprocity here.tendency of the entrant to underinvest
in coverage and he/she tends to be
more aggressive in facility investment,38
challenging the incumbent position
more strongly.
The second paper of Laffont,
Rey and Tirole (1998b) allows for the
networks to charge their customers
different prices for calls terminating on
and off the network. There are
important similarities to the case
without price-discrimination (the first
paper). For instance, there will only be
equilibrium if the access price is close
to the marginal cost and/or if the
degree of substitutability between
networks is small enough.
Nonetheless, the main point of
the second paper is that the nature of
competition is substantially affected by
the possibility of price discrimination.
Network externalities become an issue,
since the customers of one network will
be better-off as more consumers join
their specific network as calls are
cheaper within the same network
(on-net calls are cheaper compared to
off-net calls).39
The tendency under price
discrimination for high access charges
engendering tacit collusion is lower
than in the case of no-price
discrimination, but can still emerge.
High access charges can even trigger
beneficial price wars and thus the
impact of allowing for price
discrimination in terms of the collusion
propensity of the market is ambiguous.
According to the authors (1998b, p. 40),
there are two responses to an increased
off-net (access) cost, it raises its off-net
price to reflect the cost increase of
off-net calls and each network get an
incentive to increase his/her market
share in order to reduce the cost of
serving its customers in off-net calls.
There is no more incentive for
the entrant to remain as a low coverage
carrier, since there is no prohibition on
price discrimination. According to the
authors (p. 40) this occurs because in
the discrimination case, a full-coverage
incumbent can squeeze a
small-coverage entrant by insisting on a
high access price, which translates into
high off-net prices, raising more than
proportionally his/her rival costs. The
final result can be a de facto lack of
interconnection. Indeed, the authors
show the intuitive result that small scale
entry is harder under price
discrimination and that the access
charges practiced by the incumbent
require a minimum coverage of the
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38 In the “animal
terminology” of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984), the entrant
passes from an almost
puppy-dog strategy to a top-dog
strategy. In other words, he
has to defend himself more
aggressively to be able to
survive without government
sponsorship.
39 I nt h ec a s eo f
non-discrimination, by
definition, network
externalities are non-existent,
assuming that the quality
of the call is the same.entrant for entry to be viable. This
suggests that price discrimination can
reduce welfare for competition between
“unequal” networks.
However, the most important
insight of the second article is that
banning price discrimination may
reduce social welfare in the case of
“competition between equals”
(incumbent and entrant with similar
sizes). This challenges the universality
of the conventional wisdom of the
“non-discriminatory rule of thumb”
used by telecom regulators around the
world, including Brazil. Despite the fact
that price discrimination brings
misallocation of resources in the model,
since it is not related to differences in
costs and/or demand elasticities, the
authors (p. 49-50) show that price
discrimination tends to alleviate the
double marginalization problem of the
two-way interconnection when the two
networks are poor substitutes and there
is a positive mark-up on access. Second,
price discrimination tends to intensify
competition and lower average final
prices for small mark-ups. Given
this pattern, the authors (p. 55)
conclude that a dominant operator
may always defend price discrimination,
while the potential entrants have
a small coverage, becoming against
it, when competitors have entered
on a large scale.
The reason is that when the scale
of operation of the incumbent and the
entrant are not so different (in a mature
stage of the industry), the first one
prefers the accommodation of a tacit
collusion around a single uniform price
rather than a fierce price war with the
other (now strong) player.
Armstrong (1998) also develops
his model based on the likelihood of
collusion brought about by unfettered
access charge fixing (constrained by a
reciprocity condition). Similar to the
Laffont, Rey, and Tirole model with
enough differentiation between
networks, there will be adequate
incentives for using access charges as an
instrument of collusion. According to
the author (p. 554), this occurs because
high access charges increase the cost of
reducing retail prices unilaterally. Such
an action causes the deviating network
to have a net outflow of calls to the
rival network, which incur costly call
termination payments.
In this case, the author captures
the change in the type of potential
anticompetitive behavior derived from
access charge fixing in the case of
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competitors. While in the dominant
one way-access (asymmetric) case, the
anticompetitive problem was related to
a potential exclusionary behavior
(foreclosure), in the two way-access
(more symmetric) case, the problem is
collusion. In one way interconnection,
access prices can be used
anticompetitively, foreclosing the rival,
while in two-way interconnection
access prices can become a tool
for collusion.
A si nt h ec a s eo fL a f f o n t ,R e y ,
and Tirole (without common fixed
costs), the welfare maximizing access
charge is below the marginal cost just
to compensate imperfect competition.
As the collusive result implies an
access charge always greater than the
marginal costc, this free market access
pricea 1 is higher than the optimal
oneaa ca 21 2 ()  .T h u s ,t h e r ei s
scope for a welfare enhancing
regulatory intervention in the
interconnection market.
If access charges represent a
means of price coordination among
companies, there is also a case for an
active interconnection policy in a
typical cartel assessment. Of course
this co-ordination will only work when
both companies together have
sufficient market power and thus the
first stage of the two-stage rule
proposed by Katz, Rosston and
Anspacher (1995) still applies for a
previous selection of eligible
agreements to be scrutinized by the
regulatory authority.
Notice that the existence of
reciprocal double-marginalization is
one of the key points on two-way
interconnection. In this regard, we can
assess the usefulness of the ECPR rule
i nt h ec a s eo ft w o - w a y
interconnection. Indeed, if both
companies charge each other access
prices that include their respective
opportunity costs, there is a reciprocal
double marginalization problem and
the final result is lower welfare for
society. The result can reduce both
players profits as well, since ECPR
also represents a non-internalization
of a negative externality. Thus, it is
possible that the pure ECPR rule will
result in access prices higher than free
negotiation. The important message
is that the ECPR does not seem
appropriate for a two-way
interconnection.
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As shown in section 2, the scope of an
active interconnection policy can be
narrowed when the agents involved in
the interconnection agreements
(individually or jointly) do not have
enough market power to harm
competition. Thus, the need for an
active interconnection enforcement
should not be always taken for granted.
When (and if) competition increases
enough, the best strategy is to adopt the
“two-stage approach” proposed by
Katz, Rosston and Anspacher (1995).
In this case, note that, even if there is
enough market power, a cost/benefit
analysis has to be pursued to evaluate
whether an active interconnection
policy is desirable. Indeed, in some
cases, the authority can decide that it is
better not to enforce interconnection,
since competition over the best
standard can be fostered without
interconnection enforcement. However,
interconnection in a first stage of entry
can be a necessary condition for
competition to occur later and thus the
hypothesis of Mueller (1997) about a
trade-off between customization and
standardisation must not be
exaggerated. On the other hand, given
the informational requirements of this
kind of policy, the costs of intervention
are not negligible and must be
considered, at least when deciding the
degree of intervention.
The literature on transaction cost
theory and foreclosure helps to
u n d e r s t a n dw h yad e t a i l e dr u l i n go n
interconnection procedures by the
regulatory authority can be desirable.
Dominant firms can have incentives to
foreclose. There are also high
transaction costs involved in any
interconnection agreement, mainly due
to the incompleteness of the
interconnection contract. It is plausible
to assume that the incentive for
foreclosure by the incumbent will make
it more willing to enhance those
transaction costs. Therefore, there is
often a requirement for the regulatory
authority to intervene.
The incentive to foreclose caused
(or just enhanced) by a low regulated
access price is one of the defenses of
the ECPR, since it incorporates the
opportunity costs of the bottleneck
owner in providing access. However,
despite some desirable efficiency
properties of the ECPR, there are
important critiques. Indeed, ECPR is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for optimality. It is not
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unique solution of the Willig’s problem.
Second, even a solution to Willig’s
problem will not solve the problem of
monopoly rents that are the main
concern of the regulator when he/she
wishes to introduce competition in
telecommunications.
The global cap proposed by
Laffont and Tirole (1996) has the great
virtue of reconciling the theoretical
benchmark of Ramsey regulated prices
with practical implementation. The
problem is that a by-product of this
policy is that predatory pricing can
become a profitable strategy. In this
regard, Laffont and Tirole (1996)
propose that global price caps be
supplemented by the ECPR.
Though the main regulatory
authorities around the world disregard
global price cap and ECPR rules, we
think that a mix as proposed by Laffont
and Tirole (1996) constitutes a better
policy guideline, given the current state
of knowledge on interconnection. More
precisely, we think that global price
caps should be the general rule to
regulate prices. On the other hand,
some rule to prevent final prices from
diverging too far from access prices is
required to avoid predatory pricing,
and ECPR is a potential candidate.
Finally, the recent studies on
two-way interconnection show that
foreclosure is not the only concern for
policy. Collusive agreements can
emerge from market forces when there
are few but symmetric networks. As
competition in telecommunications
evolves, this concern may matter more.
Moreover, another important
insight of the Laffont, Rey, and Tirole
paper on a two-way interconnection is
that allowing price discrimination
tends to reduce this incentive for
collusion, since the greater flexibility
on pricing renders the collusive
agreement less stable.
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